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Executive Summary
We live in the second age of monopoly power. A small number of firms hold significant
market power in a wide variety of sectors of the economy, leading commentators across
the political spectrum to call for a reinvigoration of antitrust enforcement. And yet, the
antitrust agencies have been surprisingly timid in response to this challenge, and when
they have tried to assert themselves, they have often found that hostile courts block their
ability to foster competitive markets.
This report roots this problem in the structure of the antitrust laws and agencies and offers
an agenda for reform. In other areas of law, Congress delegates power to agencies, agencies
make regulations setting standards, and courts provide deferential review after the fact.
Antitrust doesn’t work this way. Courts – made up of non-expert, unaccountable judges –
set much of antitrust policy. This report provides a set of recommendations to take antitrust
away from the courts – to restructure the antitrust laws and agencies in order to enhance
the government’s ability to enforce antitrust laws more effectively and more transparently.

Recommendations:
1 Reinvent the FTC as a new Anti-Monopoly Agency (AMA)
2 Eliminate Duplicative Merger Review Authority

3 Require Transparency, Participation, and Justification for Merger Approvals
4 Institute Retrospective Review of Mergers

5 Transform the Bureau of Economics into a Bureau of Investigations and Research
6 Create an Office of Competition Advocate
7 Expand Third Party Enforcement

8 Restrict Conduct and Conditional Enforcement Remedies

9 Require the Small Business Administration to Consider Competition Policies

10 Advocate for Competition Policy Abroad

11 Require All Agencies to Incorporate Anti-Monopoly Considerations in their Decisions

12 Empower the States to Review Mega-Mergers
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Introduction: The Second Age of Monopoly Power
We live in a second age of monopoly power. The first age, which spanned from the
Gilded Age of the late 19th century through the Progressive Era in the early 20th century
was marked by the growth of corporations into “trusts.” From 1894 to 1904, hundreds
of corporations disappeared as the “Great Merger Movement” led to consolidation and
concentration in many sectors of the economy.1 Decried in the general public, the trusts
were caricatured as octopuses with tentacles extending across sectors of the economy
and into government.

“There can be no real political democracy unless there is
something approaching an economic democracy.”
Theodore Roosevelt

In response to the first age of monopoly power, Americans across party lines rallied to
fight the trusts and monopolies that threatened freedom and democracy. Republican
John Sherman of Pennsylvania authored the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and was
joined by the Republican “Trustbuster” Teddy Roosevelt in seeking to rein in powerful
corporations. Democrat Woodrow Wilson signed the Clayton Anti-Trust Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act, supported by advocate and later Supreme Court Justice
Louis Brandeis. Right and left, Americans of that era understood that massive economic
concentration was a threat not just to a free and competitive marketplace, but a threat
to our constitutional democracy. As Theodore Roosevelt put it, “There can be no real
political democracy unless there is something approaching an economic democracy.”
In recent years, we have entered a second era of monopoly power, with growing
concentration across sectors of the economy. Four airlines now control 80 percent of
the market.2 Three drug stores control 99 percent of the market.3 Four beef companies
control 85 percent of the market.4 The Fortune 100 now makes up nearly 50 percent of
GDP, with the top 20 firms capturing more than 20 percent.5
Commentators across the ideological spectrum have noticed and criticized America’s
monopoly problem: from progressives like Joe Stiglitz and neoliberals like Bloomberg’s
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Noah Smith to conservative Breitbart columnist Virgil and establishment centrists at
the Brookings Institution and The Economist.6 Even Congress has gotten involved,
with members of the House creating an Antitrust Caucus and the Senate Judiciary
Committee holding hearings on the question of the goals of antitrust.
There is widespread interest in corporate consolidation because the concentration of
economic power is a threat not just to the American economy but also to freedom and
democracy. Economically, monopolists have the ability to hold consumers hostage, raise
prices on goods and services, and deliver worse quality goods and services – which is
especially problematic when their goods or services are essential in a modern economy.
Rising concentration also contributes to widening inequality. As mega-corporations
use their market power to squeeze suppliers and consumers to gain higher profits, those
benefits accrue to their executives and shareholders, most of whom are on the wealthier
side of the population.7 Some economists have shown that growing concentration is
leading to inter-firm inequality and with it, increased inequality in society.8 Others
have found that concentrated markets lead to lower wages.9 The rise of monopolies
also threatens America’s innovative and entrepreneurial status. Powerful companies
don’t want competition and are likely to use their market (and political power) to stop,
delay, or otherwise prevent disruptive innovators from gaining traction. In recent years,
economic researchers have confirmed this: not only is the rate of new companies
plummeting across sector and geographies, but consolidation is an important factor
contributing to the decline in new business formation.10
Economic power is also a danger because it turns into political power.11 Megacorporations are able to contribute to candidates, lobby legislators and regulators,
dominate trade associations, hold cities hostage for economic giveways, and shape
the law to favor their interests at the expense of everyone else. Unlike small businesses
or ordinary individuals, mega-corporations have the resources to hire lobbyists to rig
the law in their favor – gaining tax breaks, creating regulatory loopholes, and watering
down campaign finance restrictions. When laws and regulations are created to rein
them in, they can hire armies of lawyers to fight the government in court – sometimes
for years – in order to delay or reverse sensible checks on their power. And even if they
lose in court, they can still hire thousands of lawyers to help them exploit every loophole
and ambiguity, something smaller businesses and individuals simply can’t do.
Why has growing concentration been allowed to take place? After all, America has a
long tradition of anti-monopoly activism, and we have important institutions – the
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Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department – that are tasked with preventing
the growth of monopolies. The answer comes down to two things: ideology and the
structure of the antitrust agencies.
The first failure was one of ideology. America had a robust anti-monopoly philosophy
from the founding of the country through the mid-20th century. But starting in
the 1970s, a group of professors – largely lawyers and economists – adopted a new
ideological approach to antitrust. They argued that bigness was not the problem,
that antitrust had nothing to do with political freedom, and that the only thing that
mattered in antitrust law was consumer welfare. As a result, they focused antitrust law
on reducing consumer prices and increasing economic efficiency, even if that meant
allowing mega-mergers to create vertically and horizontally-integrated behemoths
that had more power than most governments. Their prescriptions for antitrust law and
policy were also largely rooted in economic theory, rather than empirical facts and
data. For example, in a wide-ranging lookback at mergers over the last few decades,
economist John Kwoka has shown that permissive merger policies have led to an
increase in consumer prices, even though the antitrust agencies predicted a decline or
at least no increase in prices.12 Finally as antitrust became the province of technocratic
economists, it became more and more narrowly circumscribed within the FTC and
Justice Department.
The second failure was the structure of government agencies. Compared to how most
of the rest of government works, antitrust is exceptional. Normally, Congress passes
laws commanding agencies to act to regulate – the EPA regulates clean air and water,
the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration regulates safety in cars
and trucks, the Consumer Products Safety Commission regulates children’s toys. These
agencies are staffed with experts in the field, they hire scientists and commission
studies, and they are designed to receive input from industry and the general public.
Agencies are empowered to use their considerable expertise to make regulations
setting standards or regulating specific practices. Courts are able to review the agency’s
regulations, and they generally give deference to the substance of the regulation as long
as it is within the agency’s discretion and so long as the agency has used its expertise to
come to a reasoned decision. If a court strikes down an agency’s regulation for failing to
consider an aspect of the problem or acting outside their statutory authority, the agency
has a chance to correct its failure.
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Antitrust doesn’t work this way. At first, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in
order to make monopolization and monopolists’ practices illegal. The law was written
with extremely broad language, and the Supreme Court narrowed the law, declaring
that only unreasonable market practices were covered by the statute. In response,
Congress passed new antitrust laws, created an antitrust agency (the FTC), and
empowered the FTC to interpret its charter and make rules. But in practice, a timid FTC
has failed to take up its congressionally-authorized role and has largely abandoned the
project of making regulations to interpret and enforce the antitrust laws it administers.13
This has left the Supreme Court to define the substance of antitrust law. This is a
serious problem. Agencies have considerable expertise and are politically accountable
to Congress and the President. In contrast, the Court is made up of unelected,
unaccountable judges who have no expertise in business realities or any specific
sector of the economy. Worse still, the FTC now defers so completely to the Supreme
Court’s policymaking choices that it has narrowed its own statutory authorities to
align with judicially-invented policies. Judicial lawmaking in this arena also ties back
to the ideology problem. Normally, the courts provide a check on regulatory agencies,
which utilize their expertise and have a transparent process for making regulations. In
antitrust, because the courts have no expertise, they rely on the parties in the case and
academics to teach them about markets and competition through an ad-hoc process
of allowing amicus briefs during litigation.14 A skewed set of intellectual inputs, and
limited public participation, leads to judicial lawmaking that is disconnected from the
reality of the economy.

A timid FTC has failed to take up its congressionallyauthorized role and has largely abandoned the
project of making regulations to interpret and
enforce the antitrust laws it administers.
Antitrust is also exceptional because it is split between two primary agencies, the FTC
and the Department of Justice, and a host of secondary sector-based agencies. Both
agencies have power to review proposed mergers. But the division of sectors hasn’t
been set by statute and is frequently the subject of turf wars between the agencies. This
division means duplicative costs, inconsistencies in the application of the law, and
confusion in the merger clearance process.15 In theory, division could mean competition
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and a higher standard of enforcement. In practice, it has meant the opposite: weaker
enforcement and ineffective administration.
At the same time, because power is diffused across courts, a multimember FTC, and
the Department of Justice, it is harder to mobilize in order to hold the regulators
and enforcers accountable when they fail to address anticompetitive behavior in the
marketplace. When power is diffused across so many actors, no single actor is truly
empowered to take action, and it is also less clear to the general public who to organize
against and hold accountable when actions fall short.
Ideological and structural failures have left antitrust enforcers vulnerable to the rise of
the most important industry of the twenty-first century: technology platforms. While
new technologies can often seem unprecedented, antimonopoly legal tools are in fact
surprisingly versatile. One of the problems of taking an economic theory approach to
antitrust law is that it obscures how sectors of the economy work in practice. Fighting
monopolies requires understanding their business models and operations – not in
theory, but in practice. Companies like Amazon, Google, Facebook, and others are
not completely new and unprecedented in their business practices, structures, and
motivations. But without truly understanding how they actually operate, economic
theorists, and regulators who adopt their theories, can miss how tech companies might
run afoul of antimonopoly principles.16

Even the best antitrust laws will fail if we do not
reverse the unaccountable and diffuse system of
implementation and enforcement.
Reversing the second age of monopoly power requires a complete re-thinking of both
what antimonopoly law should achieve and how it should be enforced. This includes
reforming the ideology that drives antimonopoly policy and the substance of the laws,
as well as rethinking the structure of antitrust agencies and the role of other arms of
government in promoting antimonopoly policy. There is an emerging body of work on
the substance of antitrust laws, but little thought has been given to how the structure
of antitrust policymaking and enforcement should change. Even the best antitrust laws
will fail if we do not reverse the unaccountable and diffuse system of implementation
and enforcement.
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This report offers a blueprint for reforming the structural aspects of antitrust lawmaking.
The central philosophy behind these reforms is to replace the common-law, courtcentered process of making antitrust policy with a politically-accountable process that
relies on expertise and transparent, reasoned decision-making through an agency.
Taking antitrust away from the courts means reforming the structure of the antitrust
agencies and clarifying the authorities those agencies have. Power and accountability
should be aligned, as is the case in most other parts of the Executive Branch, and the
agency that makes competition policy should have both the authority to act and should
be held more readily accountable for its actions.
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RECOMMENDATION 1

End Antitrust Exceptionalism: Reinvent the
FTC as a newly empowered and accountable
Anti-Monopoly Agency (AMA)
For more than a century, antitrust has largely been a court-centered enterprise in which
judges take a “common law” approach to defining violations of antitrust laws. While
the court-centric approach does have the benefit of partial insulation from politics, it is
also insulated from democratic practice. Court-driven antitrust policy is problematic for
a variety of reasons: (1) the courts have imposed extralegal concepts largely from one
ideologically motivated wing of economics onto the field as a whole, (2) the courts are
not supposed to be economic policymakers, and (3) the courts are not very accountable
or responsive to the people. In contrast, under the traditional model of policymaking,
which occurs in virtually every other area of regulation, Congress delegates power to the
Executive Branch to establish regulations while using its expertise and following fair and
transparent procedures.
On its face, the FTC looks like a variety of other agencies. It consists of a multimember
commission, whose members are independent of the president; it has rulemaking
authority; and it executes a variety of statutes. But it also shares power with the
Department of Justice, often doesn’t exercise its rulemaking powers, and has a variety
of carve outs in its powers that cripple its ability to address all sectors of the economy
swiftly and effectively. In order to make the FTC more similar to a traditional federal
department or agency – and in the process, to shift power away from non-expert judges
as the primary expositor of the substance of antitrust policy – it is essential to revise the
agency’s management structure to align power and responsibility; to endow the agency
with strong rulemaking, inspection, and enforcement authority and clarify the reach
of its jurisdiction; and to remove unnecessary constraints on the agency’s rulemaking
process that inhibit the agency’s ability to operate efficiently.
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First, power and accountability. One of the best ways to align power and accountability
within an agency is to restructure the FTC into a new Anti-Monopoly Agency (AMA),
with a single director rather than a multimember commission. Some might argue that
the problems with the FTC have not been due to it being a multimember commission
and that there is no reason, therefore, to start fresh with a revised agency structure. But
the problems with multimember commissions, the FTC among them, are legion: (1) It is
almost impossible to have a majority of active, aggressive regulators on the commission
for any length of time, given compromise in the appointments process, (2) Minority
commissioners often write dissents that legitimize opposition to regulations and can act
as a guide or roadmap for parties to challenge the decision and for ideological judges
who want to strike down those regulations, and (3) Politicians manipulate the slots
available on the commissions for partisan purposes. Taken together, a multimember
competition agency is a roadmap for inaction and delay, weak regulations, and
ultimately ex post reversal of those weak regulations.
In contrast, single director agencies that are accountable to the President have
significant benefits: (1) They unify power, thereby empowering an active and energetic
director to undertake serious actions, (2) They unify responsibility and accountability,
creating a focal point for organizing the opposition against a failing or ideological
director, (3) As with other agencies (e.g. EPA), active directors will push the ball forward
significantly, while regressive directors will only be able to take limited action to
undermine policy – due to the stickiness of policy and industry adaptation to new rules.
To the extent that the commission structure has been beneficial in recent decades (e.g.
in minority commissioners exposing the bad policies of the majority to journalists and
the public), this is a function of an era in which competition law was in desuetude. As
we move into an era in which competition law needs to be defined and enforced more
aggressively, this feature is outweighed by the significant benefits of having an agency
that is capable of acting swiftly and effectively.
Second, rulemaking, inspection, and enforcement authority. Currently, the courts explicate
the meaning the antitrust laws on a case-by-case basis. In virtually all other areas of law,
however, politically accountable and expert agencies are in the driver’s seat – making
regulations that execute on Congress’s wishes, with accountability coming after the fact
from the courts. To align with the traditional administrative model, the new AMA should
be granted rulemaking power under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in addition to its
currently underused authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act, so that the agency
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can define and specify civil violations of these canonical antitrust laws. For example, the
agency could set per se rules and presumptions through the ordinary rulemaking process.
As is conventional under administrative law, the courts would grant Chevron deference
to rules made pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment
procedures. Although this grant of rulemaking power is only strictly necessary under the
current regime if the courts block agency actions under the act, granting the AMA these
powers preemptively and explicitly would give the agency greater flexibility.

In virtually all other areas of law, however, politically
accountable and expert agencies are in the
driver’s seat – making regulations that execute on
Congress’s wishes, with accountability coming after
the fact from the courts.
In addition, the FTC Act should be revised to clarify that the AMA would have
jurisdiction to regulate the unfair competition practices of common carriers, airlines,
and packers and stockyards. The common carrier provision, for example, has been so
broadly interpreted that a recent Ninth Circuit decision even held that the FTC cannot
regulate AT&T’s non-common-carrier-services because the firm as a whole is, in part, a
common carrier.17 The decision was overturned by the entire Ninth Circuit, but making
the AMA’s power clear would be wise. This clarification also has bipartisan support from
Democratic and Republican FTC commissioners and from the Heritage Foundation.18
The AMA’s enforcement powers should also be clarified in order to make it conform to
more traditional agency principles. The agency should, like other supervisory agencies,
have an inspections power to accomplish its supervisory goals. In addition, the agency
should be able to bring civil enforcement claims to administrative law judges, who should
have the power to order damages for violations of the antitrust laws. These decisions
would, as in other areas of regulatory enforcement, be appealable to the federal courts.
Finally, normalizing antitrust policymaking under the AMA requires repealing some
unnecessary requirements that have burdened the FTC – in particular, the MagnusonMoss constraints on consumer protection rulemakings. Under the Magnuson-Moss Act,
the FTC has to go above and beyond the standard notice-and-comment process for
rulemaking and include a variety of trial-like procedures, including oral hearings and
cross-examination. On average, when the FTC has been forced to use the Magnuson-

© 2018    |    GREATDEMOCRACYINITIATIVE.ORG

12

Moss procedures, it takes the agency more than five years to issue rules. In contrast, the
average time for the agency to issue rules under ordinary APA procedures is around
290 days.19 This is an extraordinary delay, one that cripples the agency’s ability to act in
a dynamic economy. In line with making the AMA follow ordinary administrative law
principles, these provisions should be repealed.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(A) The FTC should be relaunched as a new agency, the Anti-Monopoly Agency (AMA),
which would be headed by a single director, appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate and protected from political influence through
restrictions on their removal. The Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts (and other
legislation under the FTC’s purview) would move to the AMA. The Department of
Justice would retain criminal prosecution authority and backup civil authority.
(B) The AMA should have the power to make rules and regulations to specify and define
violations of the Clayton Act, Sherman Act, and any other competition statute. The
AMA’s interpretations of those statutes shall be granted Chevron deference by a
reviewing court.
(C) The AMA would continue as the nation’s primary consumer protection agency.
Sector-based agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission and the
Department of Transportation would retain their authorities, but Section 5(a)(2)
of the FTC Act (15 USC §45(a)(2)) would be revised to eliminate the exceptions for
common carriers, packers and stockyards, and airlines.
(D) 15 USC §57a, which establishes onerous procedures for FTC rulemaking on
consumer protection issues, under the Magnuson-Moss Act, should be repealed,
leaving the agency to make rules under traditional APA procedures.
(E) The AMA would be granted inspection authority to inspect the books and records
and management practices of companies with revenues greater than $1 billion
without suspicion of wrongdoing to deter anticompetitive conduct.
(F) The AMA should the have the authority, after notice and hearing, to order restitution
and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains for civil violations of the antitrust laws.
(G) The AMA should be insulated from the political process of Congressional
appropriations. Like the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the AMA should be granted powers to assess reasonable
fees for supervision and merger approval.
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RECOMMENDATION 2

Eliminate Duplicative Merger Review Authority
The FTC currently splits its authority over pre-merger approvals with the Department
of Justice. The conventional argument for splitting authority is that it creates regulatory
competition, which, in theory, might be beneficial. But in practice, the theory has not
been borne out. First, while divided authority has led to some competition between the
agencies for review, it has also led to significant delays. In some cases, the agencies take
up more than half of the pre-merger review time period (30 days) determining which
agency has the power to review the merger, leaving the agency with little time to conduct
a robust review.20 Second, the division of merger authority is by sector. This arbitrary
division was determined based on convention and negotiations between the two agencies
rather than by statutory authority. The result has been duplicative costs, inconsistencies
in the application of the law, and confusion in the merger clearance process.21 A better
approach is for a single agency – the AMA – to have all pre-merger approval powers,
thereby making the agency responsible for all aspects of competition policy.
While pre-merger approval powers would be a change from the status quo, enforcement
powers could remain divided, as in conventional in other agencies, like the SEC. Both
the AMA and the DOJ would have power to bring civil cases, but the DOJ alone would
have power to bring criminal cases.22

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(A) All pre-merger reviews should be conducted by the AMA.
(B) The DOJ would retain criminal investigations and prosecutions authorities, initiated
on its own and to criminal investigations and prosecutions referred to it by the AMA,
and it would retain backup civil enforcement authority.
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RECOMMENDATION 3

Require Transparency, Participation, and
Justification for Mega-Mergers
Unlike mergers of banks or telecommunications companies, for the majority of
big corporations, mergers do not require affirmative consent from their chartering
authorities or federal competition regulators. Instead, enforcement agencies must
threaten time-consuming litigation taking into account severe resource constraints.
This has the effect of biasing market outcomes toward consolidation. In addition,
when the FTC or DOJ passively approve a merger, they offer no reasoned explanation,
even if there is significant public outcry. This passive approval process makes it hard
to understand why mergers are approved and hard to understand retrospectively if
the antitrust agencies’ ex ante assumptions and analysis of the likely consequences of
mergers were accurate. In the extremely limited number of cases when FTC and DOJ do
object to a merger, under the current system, they find themselves in court litigating the
merger disapproval in front of judges with no expertise on the matter.

Merger approvals should be subject to a more
transparent and participatory regime.
As part of making the AMA more akin to an ordinary regulatory agency, merger
approvals should be subject to a more transparent and participatory regime. Any
merger involving a company with more than 1,000 employees, that has a significant
market capitalization ($1 billion), or that impacts sectors of significant public concern,
should have to be affirmatively justified with an open period for public comment
and participation. This comment period would allow stakeholders, employees,
and competitors, in addition to members of the general public, to weigh in on the
desirability of the merger and the likely consequences of the merger. The AMA would
then have to consider the public’s comments, in addition to the information it has
at its disposal, and write a decision approving or disapproving of the merger. This
written record will in turn be used to hold the agency accountable for its decision:
First, commenters and interested parties can challenge the agency’s reasoning under
the familiar arbitrary and capricious standard (for either approving or disapproving of
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the merger). Second, this written record will facilitate the agency’s ability to conduct
retrospective reviews of its mergers (see below), in order to learn from its successes
and failures.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The AMA shall have the sole authority to approve mergers, and all qualified mergers
must be affirmatively approved as mergers within the public interest.
•

Definition of a qualified merger: Any merger (a) in which either party has a market
capitalization above $1 billion, (b) in which either party has 1,000 or more employees,
or (c) which the agency determines is critical to the health, safety, or national security
of Americans.

•

Public Comment Period: For any qualified merger, there shall be a public comment
period of no less than 60 days in which the AMA shall solicit and collect comments
from the general public as to whether the merger should go through, akin to the
notice and comment process under the APA.
•

Documentation: The AMA will present an administrative record of facts and
arguments considered (with appropriate redactions) as justification for its
approval/disapproval of the merger.

•

Consideration of Comments: The AMA must consider comments in approving
a merger and must, in its approval, provide a concise and general statement of
the justifications for the merger, including addressing any counterarguments
made in the comments.

•

Review of AMA decision: Commenters shall be able to challenge the AMA’s
approval in court if the AMA has inadequately addressed the comments. Courts
shall review the AMA’s decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
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RECOMMENDATION 4

Institute Retrospective Review of Mergers
Over the past forty years, one of the problems with antitrust law and policy is that it
has relied inordinately on abstract economic theory rather than empirical reality. This
is problematic because the benefits and drawbacks of mergers (and of competition
policies more generally) might not accord with the academic theories of economists.
Indeed, recent empirical research on post-merger approvals has shown that the antitrust
agencies have largely failed even on their own terms of achieving lower prices.23
The AMA should look backwards at its merger approvals and determine whether their
ex ante analysis of mergers has been successful. Retrospective review will help the AMA
learn from empirical evidence and modify its behavior accordingly over time.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The AMA shall conduct retrospective analysis of all qualified mergers 5 years after the
merger, in order to assess whether the merger actually led to decreased concentration in
the market, more competition, and lower prices. The retrospective analysis should also
assess whether the AMA’s predictions used to approve the merger were borne out. The
AMA’s reports shall be delivered to Congress and made publicly available.
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RECOMMENDATION 5

Transform the Bureau of Economics into a Bureau
of Investigations and Research (BIR)
How do we know if an industry is overly concentrated? How do we know where
exclusionary and anticompetitive practices are taking place? In the early 20th century,
the answer was simple: the FTC conducted industry-wide investigations.24 These were
in-depth investigations using the FTC’s section 6b powers to identify and expose
competitive and market power problems in industry. These investigations could then
lead to prosecutions for illegal practices. Over time, however, the FTC’s investigative
mission has atrophied. Today, the FTC’s competition work is largely supported by
economists, rather than a broader group of diverse professionals needed to conduct
industry-specific investigations.
The AMA should reinvigorate its investigatory and research capacities by replacing the
Bureau of Economics with a much broader Bureau of Investigations and Research that
will be composed of a variety of personnel with the professional skillsets and expertise
necessary to conduct effective industry-wide investigations. These investigations will
not only inform merger approvals (as the BIR will know a great deal about industries
in which mergers are taking place) but also the enforcement of both competition and
consumer law.
The BIR would also be tasked with conducting retrospective reviews, rather than the
office that approves mergers. Although there is some loss of expertise in dividing
approvals and retrospective review, the purpose of separating retrospective reviews is to
enhance the independence of the review in order to prevent the natural human-need to
justify and defend past actions.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Bureau of Economics should be transformed into new Bureau of Investigations and
Research.
•

Authorities: The BIR will (1) conduct investigations under FTC section 6b and its new
inspection powers, and write reports on industry practices, (2) conduct retrospective
reviews as provided for above, and (3) provide support to the Bureaus of Competition
and Consumer Protection when requested.

•

Composition: The BIR shall be composed of a diverse group of employees, including
lawyers, investigators, accountants, data scientists, sociologists, anthropologists,
historians, economists, engineers, technologists, and any others whose training
might be relevant for investigatory purposes. No more than 20% of the BIR’s full time
employees, part time employees, or consultants shall come from any one discipline.
The head of BIR shall have experience in investigations.
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RECOMMENDATION 6

Create an Office of Competition Advocate
Not all knowledge lies with experts, and particularly with experts in government.
Knowledge is often diffuse, held by members of the general public. This is perhaps
especially true when it comes to knowledge about uncompetitive behavior in a large and
diverse economy. Experts in government are often drawn from similar communities
as the entities they regulate, which means they might have a limited perspective. While
the Bureau of Investigations and Research can conduct independent investigations
into particular sectors of the economy, the BIR might not always know about the most
pressing or the most cutting-edge sectors in which an investigation might be necessary.
The AMA and DOJ can prosecute bad behavior but they might not know where all of the
bad behavior is. Members of the general public affected by uncompetitive practices, in
contrast, might have that knowledge.
The AMA should, as a result, have an Office of Competition Advocate, which would
be tasked with taking complaints from the general public and channeling that diffuse
public knowledge into forms that the AMA can use. First, the Competition Advocate
would maintain a complaint hotline, in order to assist the AMA in its enforcement
mission on both unfair competition consumer practices. Data from the hotline will be
public, so that it can be analyzed by independent scholars. To prevent abuse, fraudulent
complaints will be punishable by a fine. In addition, the Competition Advocate
would work with other agencies throughout the government to identify possible
anticompetitive practices from data collected by those agencies.
Second, members of the general public would have the ability to petition the
competition advocate with information about an area that is ripe for a BIR investigation.
The Competition Advocate would sift through the information and write a report on
the comments. The BIR will be able to use the report to identify areas that are worthy
of a full investigation. This process has a variety of benefits. Not only does it provide
an additional way for the BIR to gain information from the general public, but it also
engages the general public through a participatory process.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
There should be an Office of Competition Advocate (OCA) within the AMA. The
competition advocate will take complaints from the general public regarding
competition and market power problems in industry, including accepting petitions for
BIR investigations that come from the general public.
•

Complaints: The OCA will maintain a complaint hotline and keep a database on
complaints about unfair competition practices. The data from this database shall be
made public, and fraudulent complaints shall be punishable by a fine. In addition,
the OCA will write an annual report summarizing and analyzing trends and issues
raised by complaints, including making recommendations to the AMA based on the
complaints. In addition, the OCA should be empowered to contact and learn from
community groups and state attorneys general.

•

Petitions for Investigations: Members of the general public can petition the OCA to
recommend that the BIR investigate a particular sector. Each year, the OCA will write
a report summarizing the comments received, and it will recommend areas that are
particularly worthy of investigation.
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RECOMMENDATION 7

Expand Third Party Enforcement
Federal agencies have limited resources. This means that they frequently have to make
choices about which entities to investigate and against which entities to enforce the
law. The result, however, is the underenforcement of law. In response, Congress has
frequently given state attorneys general and even private citizens the power to enforce
the laws. Under current law, state attorneys general do not have the authority to enforce
violations of the Clayton Act’s provisions on price discrimination, exclusive dealing and
tying, and interlocking directorates (among other things). Expanding state AG power
to include these elements will help ensure that the law is enforced even if the AMA and
DOJ are unwilling or unable to enforce it to its fullest extent.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
State Attorneys General should be able to enforce certain Clayton Act provisions:
section 2 (price discrimination), section 3 (exclusive dealing and tying), section 8
(interlocking directorates).
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RECOMMENDATION 8

Restrict Conduct and Conditional Enforcement
Remedies and Ensure Full Enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws
The DOJ and FTC frequently use conduct and conditional remedies instead of banning
mergers outright. The idea is that a merger can still go through if the merging entities
agree to a set of conditions that will prevent anticompetitive harms from taking
place. While the theory of conduct and conditional remedies is promising, scholars
have shown empirically that conduct and conditional remedies are at a minimum
ineffectual and at worst counterproductive.25 In cases where the antitrust agencies
have used conduct and conditional remedies, prices have sometimes actually gone up
after mergers. The ban on conduct and condition remedies could be implemented by
executive order, by the agencies themselves voluntarily, or by statute.
Furthermore, in 2015, the FTC issued a statement of enforcement principles that severely
restricts its own enforcement powers, in contravention of legislative intent. It limits
enforcement to cases of consumer welfare, conflates section 5 of the FTC Act with the
rule of reason, and appears to suggest the FTC has limited discretion to bring challenges
under the FTC Act. This document should be disavowed explicitly, so that the AMA is
clear that it must act in accordance with the broader goals of antitrust, that section 5
of the FTC Act is broader than the rule of reason, and that the agency has discretion to
challenge practices under the FTC Act, Sherman, and Clayton Acts.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(A) The Department of Justice and AMA should be directed not to use conduct
and conditional remedies.
(B) The 2015 FTC’s statement of enforcement principles under section 5 should
be withdrawn.
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RECOMMENDATION 9

Require the Small Business Administration to
Consider Competition Policies
Surprisingly, the Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy is not tasked with
advocacy on competition and concentration within the United States Government,
despite the obvious interest of small businesses in maintaining a competitive economy
and preventing economic concentration. Currently, the Office of Advocacy is tasked
with measuring the costs of regulations and making proposals to deregulate, when
such actions would be in the interest of small businesses. But regulations have benefits,
not just costs, and many regulations might help small businesses, particularly if they
preserve competition, prevent economic concentration, or expand access to goods
and services. The laws directing the office of advocacy’s efforts, however, ignore this
possibility. This should be changed.
In addition, the Office of Advocacy has not been directed to evaluate the impact of
consolidation within industries in the economy on small businesses, provide comments
to the FTC and DOJ on the likely harms to small businesses from mergers, and provide
comments to agencies on the impact on small businesses of rules that might lead to
consolidation in industry. The office should be empowered to do so because such
advocacy could be helpful to small businesses.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(A) Require, in 15 U.S.C. §643b(3), the SBA office of advocacy to measure the benefits of
regulation and the impact of the failure to regulate on small businesses, and require
the office to make proposals for regulations that help small businesses.
(B) Empower, in 15 U.S.C. §643b, the SBA to evaluate the impact of consolidation within
industries in the economy on small businesses, provide comments to the AMA on the
likely harms to small businesses from mergers, and provide comments to agencies on
the impact on small businesses of rules that might lead to consolidation in industry.
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RECOMMENDATION 10

Advocate for Competition Policy Abroad
After World War II, the United States engaged in a historic effort to rebuild Europe and
Japan through the Marshall Plan. While the story of the Marshall Plan is well known, what
is less commonly understood is that the United States exported aggressive antitrust laws
to Europe during those post-war years. The Marshall Plan antitrust advisors believed that
the massive consolidation in the German economy facilitated and sustained fascism, and
they argued that a democratic society required a democratic economy.26 Today, in the
context of increasing concentration, rising authoritarianism, and foreign governments
commingling state and markets through state-owned enterprises and state capitalism,
promoting economic democracy abroad should be an essential foreign policy objective.
And yet, the text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement designed by the
Obama Administration, established the objectives of competition policy as “economic
efficiency and consumer welfare,” a narrowly drawn and ideological conception of the
purposes of antitrust law that has no basis in U.S. statutory law.27 Presidents and their
administrations should abandon these cramped views of antitrust and instead encourage
the adoption of more aggressive antitrust laws abroad.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States Trade Representative should advocate for aggressive and expansive antimonopoly standards and practices in its trade agreements and international negotiations.
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RECOMMENDATION 11

Require All Agencies to Incorporate Anti-Monopoly
Considerations in their Decisions
During his final year in office, President Obama issued an important executive order
requiring agencies to identify and use authorities to promote competition.28 This
executive order was a big step forward in pushing departments and agencies to think
about anti-monopoly policies. But a new executive order, or a statute, could go further
and require that in any rulemaking or major guidance document, any department
or agency must consider the impact of the policy on consolidation and competition.
Agencies are already required to consider the impact of regulations on federalism,
paperwork burdens, and small businesses; adding the impact on consolidation
and competition might help build anti-monopoly thinking into the agencies’ DNA.
In addition, agencies should consider concentration and competition in making
contracting and procurement decisions, so that the agencies can facilitate competition
instead of furthering concentration.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Agencies should be required, by executive order or statute, to consider the impact of
rulemakings and major guidance on consolidation and competition, and to include
anti-monopoly considerations in their contracting and procurement decisions.
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RECOMMENDATION 12

Empower the States to Review Mega-Mergers
Historically, corporate charters were granted by legislatures. The reasoning was that the
advancement of limited liability and shared investor capital would foster innovation,
trade, and economic activity. But today, too many states make the formation of
corporations nothing more than a formality. In the absence of corporate chartering at
the federal level, states must play their role in ensuring that the pursuits of corporate
profit remain aligned with broader public purposes and economic competition.
In addition to affirmative approval by the AMA, the relevant state of incorporation
should establish conditions on charters that incorporate antitrust goals. This serves as an
important check on whether the corporation is seeking to expand for purposes aligned
with the public interest.
Of course, this could lead to the loosening of standards for some states seeking to
be friendly to corporations. To prevent a race to the bottom, the AMA should outline
minimum standards that chartering agencies should adhere to. Every five years, the AMA
should publish a report on state compliance with these standards.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
•

States should establish standards for corporate charters that incorporate antitrust goals.

•

The AMA should establish minimum standards as guidance for states on how to
include antitrust goals as part of corporate chartering, and it should publish a report
evaluating the states every five years.
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